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Chapter 1: Union Certification Success under 
Voting versus Card-Check Procedures 
The first chapter of the dissertation examines the 
impact of mandatory election laws on union certification 
success using data on private sector certification attempts 
from British Columbia over the 1978-1998 period. The 
paper exploits a unique natural experiment. Prior to 1984, 
British Columbia had the traditional Canadian card-
check system, where the union can be certified without 
an election if they sign up a sufficient proportion of the 
proposed bargaining unit. J In 1984, a mandatory election 
system was introduced, where a secret-ballot vote was 
required if the minimum threshold was signed up. The 
election system was then repealed in 1993 and replaced 
with the original card-check procedure. Moreover, by 
exploiting the timing of various legislative changes that 
occurred over the sample period, the effect of mandatory 
voting can be isolated from other legislative changes.2 
The paper then examines the role of management 
opposition across the two different union recognition 
procedures.3 
In general, mandatory election laws are believed to 
lead to lower certification success rates for two reasons: 
1) management has more opportunity to oppose the bid 
in a voting system, and 2) peer pressure from pro-union 
colleagues and union organizers may artificially inflate 
the "true" level of support in a card-check system. With 
respect to management opposition, a change in the union 
recognition law may have two effects: 1) the effectiveness 
of management opposition may change, and 2) the 
incidence of management opposition may change.4 
Figure 1 shows success rates for the private and 
public sectors, with withdrawn certifications and raids 
excluded. The pattern in Figure 1 is striking. Success 
rates for private sector organizing drives fell by nearly 20 
percentage points following the introduction of mandatory 
elections in May of 1984. Moreover, in 1993, success 
rates appear to have recovered to their pre-voting levels, 
and remained as such through the remainder of the sample 
period. Interestingly, public sector success rates did not 
systematically decline. 
Econometric analysis that exploits the timing of 
various changes in legislation suggests that mandatory 
elections alone can account for the entire decline in 
private sector success rates. The other major issue 
addressed in the paper is the role of management 
opposition. I estimate the impact of unfair labor practices5 
on certification success over the 1987-1998 period, which 
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covers one card-check regime and one mandatory election 
regime. In addition, I use a decomposition procedure to 
provide some evidence as to how much of the decline in 
success rates associated with the voting regime can be 
attributed to a change in the incidence of management 
opposition, and how much can be attributed to a change in 
the effectiveness of management opposition. Overall, the 
central results are as follows: 1) management opposition 
is at least twice as effective under an election system, 
2) there is no difference in the incidence of management 
opposition across the different union recognition regimes, 
and 3) management opposition can account for 25 percent 
of the decline in success rates. 
Chapter 2: Welfare Checks, Drug Consumption, 
and Health 
The second chapter examines the impact of the 
dis11'ibution of welfare checks on the distribution of drug 
consumption. The relationship between social assistance 
and substance abuse has been a topic of much debate in 
the United States, where, in 1996, Public Law 104-121 
telminated Supplemental Security Income and Social 
Security Disability Income (SSIIDI) for recipients with 
a primary diagnosis related to substance abuse. The 
rationale for the law was a belief that such recipients 
were spending the money on drugs and alcohol such that 
welfare was effectively "aiding and abetting addiction" 
(Cohen 1994). Canadian law rarely makes special 
provisions for substance abuse. 6 
A few studies in the public health literature have 
shown evidence of so-called "check effects"; that is, a 
relationship between the day welfare checks are released 
and subsequent increases in outcomes such as hospital 
admissions, drug-related fatalities, and 911 calls. In 
addition, economists have examined the relationship 
between identifiable, preannounced income changes 
and consumption. One such study directly tests for 
a consumption-related check effect among welfare 
recipients and finds that the probability and amount of 












daily expenditures increases markedly on the day of check 
arrival (Stephens 2003). 
This paper contributes to the check -effect literature by 
conducting a unique test using hospital admissions data 
on injection drug users ("IDU") from the Canadian city of 
Vancouver.7 The paper addresses the question of whether 
drug users are more likely to leave the hospital against 
medical advice ("AMA")-thereby intenupting their 
treatment-on the day that welfare checks are released. 
Check day is linked to drug consumption by examining 
drug overdose admissions. In particular, I test whether 
check day is an environmental cue that triggers drug 
use by using "Welfare Wednesday" as an instrument to 
estimate the Local Average Treatment Effect of leaving 
AMA on subsequent readmission and the likelihood of a 
subsequent drug overdose. 8 
From a theoretical perspective, the possible 
relationship between welfare checks and drug 
consumption has various components. One component is 
the pure income effect story. Based on Cohen (1994), it 
is clear that the 1997 change in U.S. law was predicated 
on the notion that terminating SSIIDI benefits may lead 
to reduced drug consumption. To date, we are unaware 
of any study that has convincingly examined the income 
effect side of the substance use/welfare debate. Indeed, 
we are unable to directly test for income effects in this 
paper since we do not observe an individual's benefit 
level. In this paper we address the question of whether the 
distribution of welfare payments affects the distribution 
of drug consumption over time. Based on the addiction 
literature there are two key reasons why we anticipate 
a spike in drug consumption-or "bingeing"-in the 
days following welfare day: 1) the neurophysiology 
of intravenous cocaine use and, to a lesser extent, 
intravenous heroin use9; and 2) environmental cues. IO 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of discharges (AMA 
discharges relative to planned discharges, which together 
equal total discharges) over the sample period. A clear 
Figure 2 Distribution of Discharges, FY1996-2000 
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spike is observed on the day welfare checks are released. 
The results from econometric analysis confinn that 
individuals induced to leave AMA by Welfare Wednesday 
are readmitted to the hospital much sooner than other 
patients, have longer subsequent stays in the hospital, and 
are more likely to be readmitted with a drug overdose. 
Chapter 3: The Long-Run Effects of Income 
Support: Unemployment Insurance in Maine and 
New Brunswick, 1940-1991 
The final chapter examines the long-run impact of 
unemployment insurance. Existing studies of the labor 
market effects of income support programs focus mainly 
on short-term responses to policy changes. 11 Some critics 
have argued that such studies may dramatically understate 
the long-telm effects of these programs. Over a longer 
time horizon, individuals have the ability to make larger 
adjustments in their behavior, and to adjust on a wider 
number of margins, in some cases effectively building a 
"lifestyle" around the programs in question. 
This paper attempts to measure the long-tenn effects 
of large-scale changes in income support policy by 
taking advantage of a dramatic natural experiment. This 
experiment results from the fact that a national border-
between New Brunswick and Maine-divides a region 
with a relatively homogenous population and resource 
endowment, but which experienced dramatically different 
changes in income support policy.12 By 1940, Maine had 
a modest unemployment insurance (UI) system, but New 
Brunswick had none. In 1950, the two systems were velY 
similar. After that, New Brunswick's system grew much 
more rapidly, to the point where New Bnmswick's system 
in 1980-1990 was astonishingly generous to workers 
with very short work histories. Using the five decennial 
censuses spanning the period 1940-1991, the paper 
exploits the comparison between these two jurisdictions 
over time to estimate the long-telm effects ofUI program 
parameters on labor market outcomes. 13 
Up to 1954, the two regions were quite similar with 
respect to UI policies. For example, UI constituted 
around 10-12 percent of all transfers. This ratio remains 
relatively constant in Maine until about 1962, after which 
UI falls to between 3 and 10 percent of all transfers for 
the remainder of the period under study. The trends in 
New Brunswick could not be more different: the generous 
1955 UIAct increased the relative importance of the VI 
program to more than 25 percent of all transfers in New 
Brunswick by 1958. Efforts to reduce UI transfers via 
repeat user rules l4 in the early 1960s lowered this ratio to 
levels similar to Maine through the late 1960s and early 
1970s, but the extremely generous 1971 UI Act raised 
the ratio to more than 25 percent from the mid-1970s to 
1991. Indeed, by the end of the sample period, UI in New 
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Brunswick accounted for nearly 6 percent of provincial 
GDP. Furthermore, by 1980-1990, an individual working 
15 weeks every year could collect nearly 40 weeks of 
income evelY year. 
The paper's focus is on the incidence of part-year 
work among workers and has two main components. 
The first component uses grouped cell-level census data 
for the entire 1940-1991 period. A unit of observation 
here is an industry-gender-region-year cell; for each such 
cell we calculate the fraction of persons working part 
year (defined here as less than 40 weeks), and analyze 
its responsiveness to the relative income of part- versus 
full-year workers in that cell, as determined by prevailing 
wage rates and VI program rules. The second component 
estimates the entire distribution of annual work weeks 
using census micro-data from the three decades, 1970-
1991, for which it is available in both regions. 
The data indicate that men in Maine and New 
Brunswick had a similar, high incidence of part-year 
work in 1940. However, while men's part-year work 
significantly declined over the next five decades in 
Maine, it did not in New Brunswick. Among women, 
part-year work was substantially less common in New 
Brunswick than Maine in 1940; by 1990 this pattern had 
been dramatically reversed as a result of growth in New 
Brunswick and decline in Maine. 
Both the cell-level and individual-level empirical 
analyses generate estimates of VI program effects that 
are lasting and large. For example, by 1990, 6.1 percent 
of employed men in Maine worked fewer than 27 hours 
per week; in New Brunswick that figure was 20.8 percent. 
According to the estimates, New Brunswick's much more 
generous UI system accounts for about two thirds of this 
differential. Among working women, 13.8 percent worked 
less than halfthe year in Maine compared to 26.2 percent 
in New Brunswick, with VI policy differences accounting 
for essentially all of the difference. 
Overall, the results suggest that the large expansion in 
income support inherent in the Canadian system over the 
latter half of the twentieth century may have preserved a 
"way of life" among men that has become largely extinct 
in Maine. For women, Canadian VI appears to have 
created a new pattern of part-year labor force participation 
that would not have otherwise existed. 
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Notes 
1. The proportion required to avoid an election varies by 
province but generally has ranged between 50 percent and 
55 percent. While it is possible for a certification bid to 
require a vote in a card-check province, the reality is that 
few organizing drives go to an election. Hist0l1cally, all 
Canadian provinces, except Nova Scotia since 1977, have 
had "card-check" procedures, but this has changed with an 
increasing number of provinces going the election route 
over the past decade. In addition, over the 1984-1998 
period, union density fell by about 7 percentage points 
in Canada-similar to the 8-percentage-point decline in 
the United States during the same years. Many observers 
believe that the recent decline of both unions and the card-
check system is no coincidence. 
2. Three legislative changes were made to the British 
Columbia Labour Code over the sample period of October 
1978- May 1998. The first, when mandatOlY elections were 
introduced, was in 1984. Unlike many legislative packages 
passed in Canada that included mandatory elections, the 
1984 amendment made very few changes to the labour 
code. Second, in 1987, sweeping changes were made to 
the code when the Industrial Relations Reform Act was 
introduced. Finally, in 1993, mandatory elections were 
repealed. However, many ofthe "voting era" amendments 
were maintained. 
3. The only previous paper that has isolated the effect of 
mandatory elections is Johnson (2002), who finds that 
elections reduce certification success by 9 percentage 
points. For the United States, Eaton and Kriesky (2001) find 
some evidence that success rates are higher in cases decided 
by card-check relative to elections 
4. A voting regime may increase the effectiveness of 
employer tactics for two reasons: 1) the amount of time 
that employers have to influence the organizing drive 
is unambiguously greater in the voting system (indeed, 
under card-check law many organizing drives are virtually 
complete before the employer is aware of the drive); 
and 2) management opposition is likely to be more effective 
in a voting regime because of the secret ballot vote itself. 
For instance, under card-checks, if the employer coerces 
employees into refhsing to sign cards, union organizers and 
proIDlion colleagues can counteract the coercion tactics. In 
a secret ballot vote, the opportunity to counteract employer 
threats is likely diminished. 
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5. Another issue is the potential endogeneity ofULPs (i.e., 
if the employer believes success is contestable and can 
be influenced, they are more likely to pursue an antiunion 
campaign compared to situations where success is very 
likely or very unlikely). Instmmental variable regressions 
are estimated to account for this potential endogeneity. 
Overall, the findings are similar. The results imply that 
standard ULP estimates are biased toward zero. 
6. Income assistance laws are under provincial jurisdiction 
in Canada. Our reading of the provincial laws for the five 
largest provinces is that only Ontario (in a legislative 
change made in 1997) has a strong restriction on collecting 
disability support if dependent on (or addicted to) alcohol 
or dmgs (see subsections 2 and 3 of section 5, part 1 of the 
Ontario Disability Support Program Act). However, the 
Ontario law is not as restrictive as the U.S. law, because an 
individual with an addiction can remain eligible for benefits 
if they have a "substantial physical or mental impairment" 
(see subsection 3), which would generally include HIV/ 
AIDS and various psychiatric conditions, both of which are 
common among the injection dmg users in our data. 
7. The dmg use situation in Vancouver is dire. In 1993 
dmg overdoses from heroin became the leading cause 
of death among men 30~9 years of age. Through the 
1990s, Vancouver has consistently had the highest overall 
levels of overdose deaths in Canada, with more than 300 
in 1998 alone and more than 2000 between 1991 and 
1998. According to a statement by the British Columbia 
General Coroner, Vancouver's overdose death rate is "velY 
likely" the highest in North America. The incidence rate 
of HIV infection among Vancouver's injection dmg users 
is conservatively estimated to be 25 percent, with some 
articles in the media quoting a rate as high as 50 percent. 
Even with the conservative estimates, Vancouver is widely 
believed to have one of the highest levels of HI V infection 
among injection dmg users in North America, and similar to 
cities such as New York and Bangkok. 
8. Welfare checks are distributed once a month in the province 
of British Columbia, usually on the last Wednesday. 
9. The more rapid a dmg's onset of action, the greater the 
euphoria users experience and the more they "like" the 
dmg. Cocaine and heroine-particularly when used 
intravenously-are especially rapid in their delivety to 
the brain. Moreover, in the case of cocaine, the rate of 
removal from the brain is extremely fast. This is believed 
to be a key reason why individuals who become addicted 
to cocaine tend to move toward a "binge and crash" pattern 
of use, in addition to moving from intranasal and smoking 
administration toward intravenous use. 
10. Research in both the psychology and neuroscience 
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fields has found that consumption-pat1icularly dmg 
consumption-may be linked to cel1ain environmental 
cues (see Laibson [2001] for a review of these literatures). 
This notion implies that once a culture of dmg use has 
been established-such as in the Downtown Eastside of 
Vancouver-it would be very difficult for a user to resist 
dmg use once exposed to that culture, even iftheir intention 
was not to use dmgs. Indeed, Welfare Wednesday itself may 
have become an environmental cue. 
11. Of course, for a variety of reasons, the long-term effects of 
income support programs are much harder to measure than 
short-term effects. One reason is that large-scale changes in 
such programs tend only to be made at the national level. 
As a result, a "control group" is typically not available 
to indicate what might have happened in the absence of 
a policy change. Identification of long-term effects in 
nonexperimental studies is further hampered by the greater 
leeway for confotmding variables such as macroeconomic 
conditions to change over longer periods; problems that 
can be avoided in sh011-tetlli studies using, for example, 
a regression-discontinuity design. Experimental studies, 
which solve the control group problem via random 
assignment, tend to be very limited in duration and to focus 
on small variations in program parameters. 
12. Maine is the northeastern most state in the United States, 
Imown for its fishing industry, coastal scenery, cold climate, 
mral character, and relatively low incomes. New Bmnswick 
is the Canadian province that borders directly on Maine, 
lmown for similar traits. Both regions have populations 
that are ovelwhelmingly white and native-born. Growth in 
population and real income per capita were ahnost identical 
in both regions, well behind their respective country 
averages. Much of the paper uses the northern counties of 
Maine as the comparison group-the northern counties are 
where much of the primary sector is and overall industry 
mix and education levels are more comparable to New 
Bmnswick. 
13. One paper that examines long-term effects of income 
assistance is from Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001), who 
study the longer-run effects of reforms to the welfare 
system and the earned income tax credit, using women 
without children as a control group for those much more 
affected by these policy changes-women with children. A 
necessaty feature of studies like Meyer and Rosenbaum's 
is the use of a control group that is drawn from the same 
economy as the "treatment" group. As a result, their 
estimates may be contaminated by general equilibrium 
effects of policy changes. FUl1her, the control group, of 
necessity, is demographically different from the treatment 
group (e.g., childless women versus mothers), and it is not 
clear that the maintained assumption of identical policy 
effects on both groups is plausible. The prospect of using 
the same demographic groups in similar neighboring 
regional economies over long periods of time, and in the 
presence of large differential changes in income support 
programs, may provide an important new perspective in 
estimating the effects of social policy changes. 
14. Interestingly, Maine is the only state to have a repeat-
user rule, and is only one of four states to have specific 
"seasonal worker" regulations. 
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